

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION AF-04

INFO OCT-01 NEA-07 ISO-00 L-01 H-01 INR-05 PM-03 PRS-01

SP-02 IGA-01 ACDA-10 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EUR-12 NSC-05

NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SS-14 /068 W

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P R 041720Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5089

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY BAMAKO

AMEMBASSY DAKAR

AMEMBASSY RABAT

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 NOUAKCHOTT 0282

LIMDIS

3.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR MILI XA MR

SUBJECT: REGIONAL ARMS RESTRAINT STUDY - MAURITANIA

REF: STATE 20621

SUMMARY: HEAVY AND CONTINUING ATTACKS ON MAURITANIAN ARMED FORCES, CIVILIAN POPULATION, SETTLEMENTS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE BY ALGERIAN AND LIBYAN ARMED AND SUPPORTED POLISARIO FRONT HAVE FORCED MAURITANIAN GOVERNMENT TO EMBARK ON LARGE-SCALE AND URGENT ARMS ACQUISITION PROGRAM. CRITICAL NEED FOR CRASH MILITARY BUILD-UP NOW IS DIRECT RESULT OF CONSCIOUS GOVERNMENTAL DECISION FOR ARMS RESTRAINT IN PAST. GIRM HAS TURNED TO MOROCCO, FRANCE, AND US FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT; MOROCCAN AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY (VIA AIRLIFT) AND ON LARGE SCALE. DURATION AND DIRECTION OF ARMS ACQUISITION PROGRAM WILL BE FUNCTION OF COURSE THAT ON-GOING SAHARA WAR TAKES. ARMS RESTRAINT WILL NOT AGAIN BE A REAL ISSUE IN MAURITANIA UNTIL SAHARA WAR HAS FADED INTO HISTORY. END SUMMARY.

1. AT OUTSET OF ITS NATIONAL EXISTENCE IN EARLY 1960S

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GIRM DECIDED TO DEVOTE ITS VERY LIMITED RESOURCES TO

DEVELOPMENT AND TO ESTABLISH ONLY ABSOLUTE MINIMUM MILITARY/SECURITY FORCES REQUIRED FOR TRAPPINGS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER. DURING EVERY ANNUAL BUDGET CYCLE SINCE THEN, ORIGINAL GIRM DECISION HAS BEEN REAFFIRMED IN CONCRETE TERMS: MODEST FUNDS ALLOCATED TO DEFENSE AND INTERIOR MINISTRIES HAVE ONLY BEEN SUFFICIENT TO RAISE AND EQUIP (AFTER A FASHION) A TOTAL OF 2500 MILITARY AND POLICE WITH PERSONAL WEAPONS (OBSOLETE RIFLES, PISTOLS, AND LIGHT MACHINE GUNS), A MODEST NUMBER OF CREW-SERVED MACHINE GUNS, A HALF DOZEN GIFT ARTILLERY PIECES, AND A VERY LIMITED AMOUNT OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (TRUCKS, JEEPS, ETC.). ON NOVEMBER 28, 1975 GIRM AIR FORCE HAD FOUR OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT: TWO PUSH/PULL CESSNAS AND TWO BRAND-NEW LIGHT CARGO AIRCRAFT (SKYVANS) DELIVERED JUST IN TIME FOR FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS.

2. SERIES OF HARD-HITTING ATTACKS ACROSS TRADITIONAL (I.E. PRE SAHARA) FRONTIER BY POLISARIO/ALGERIAN GUERRILLA WARFARE TEAMS ON MAURITANIAN SETTLEMENTS AND INSTALLATIONS IN FAR NORTH AND ALONG IRON ORE RAILROAD FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED GIRM VIEW OF TYPE OF MILITARY/SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT REQUIRED FOR PRESERVATION OF INTEGRITY OF NATION. REACTING QUICKLY, GOVERNMENT FRANTICALLY EMBARKED ON URGENT ARMS ACQUISITION PROGRAM. SOME IN AND OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT DECLARED THAT DEMONSTRATED WEAKNESS OF MAURITANIAN FORCES IN FACE OF POLISARIO/ALGERIAN ONSLAUGHT "PROVED" THAT POLICY OF STARVING MILITARY IN PAST HAD BEEN GRAVE ERROR AND MUST BE PERMANENTLY ABANDONED. SENIOR OFFICIALS WITH SOMEWHAT BROADER AND LONGER PERSPECTIVE PLUS DEVELOPMENT-MINDED MPS, BUREAUCRATS, AND INTERESTED CITIZENS STILL HOPE TO BE ABLE TO LIMIT REQUIRED CITIZENS STILL HOPE TO BE ABLE TO LIMIT REQUIRED TRANSFER OF RESOURCES TO NON-ECONOMIC MILITARY/SECURITY ACTIVITIES TO THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM IMPOSED BY THE NEW REALITIES OF REGIONAL RIVALRY AND TO PRESERVE INTACT MAXIMUM PROPORTION OF DEVELOPMENT EFFORT. CLEARLY, HOWEVER, MILITARY BUILD-UP IS ON RATCHET: DEVELOPERS WILL NOT BE ABLE FOR SEVERAL YEARS IF EVER TO GET MILITARY BUDGET BACK TO 1974 LEVEL.

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3. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN (A) WHETHER GIRM HAS OR CAN OBTAIN FROM ITS EASTERN ARAB AND OTHER FRIENDS THE RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MEET BOTH SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS/GOALS, AND (B) WHETHER PRO-DEVELOPMENT FORCES WITHIN GIRM AND IN POPULATION AT LARGE WILL BE ABLE TO FORCE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT BACK ON NEAR BREAD AND WATER DIET AFTER THEY HAVE SAVORED RICH FEAST OF FANCY

NEW HARDWARE AND PUBLIC PRAISE.

4. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS IN GIRM ARE REFRESH-  
INGLY REALISTIC IN THEIR CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THEIR  
ABILITY TO ABSORB AND USE COMPLEX MILITARY HARDWARE.  
THEY KNOW THEY DO NOT HAVE AND WILL NOT HAVE FOR SEVERAL  
YEARS THE CAPABILITY OF OPERATING AND MAINTAINING  
SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS (HIGH-PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT,  
MISSILES, TANKS). BUT APPETITES OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY  
COULD CHANGE. REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY GUERILLA WAR IN  
SAHARA HAVE ALREADY PROMPTED MILITARY TO TALK OF ACQUIRING  
RECON-PARATROOP AIRCRAFT OF DEGREE OF TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL  
SOPHISTICATION WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKA-  
BLE THREE MONTHS AGO. THE LONGER SAHARA WAR LASTS AND  
TOUGHER IT BECOMES, THE LOUDER AND MORE INSISTENT WILL  
BECOME CRIES OF FIGHTING MAN FOR BETTER AND MORE WEAPONS.  
AT MOMENT IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO GUAGE PRESENT OR  
PREDICT FUTURE APPETITE. ONLY HARD INFORMATION AVAILABLE  
IS THAT MAURITANIANS HAVE BEEN HANDING NEW ARMS SHOPPING  
LIST TO FRENCH ON ALMOST WEEKLY BASIS--WHICH FRENCH HAVE  
JUST AS REGULARLY BEEN GETTING AND RIGOROUSLY REDUCING  
IN SIZE AND SCOPE FOR QUANTITY AND COMPLEXITY REASONS.  
(BUT IT MUST BE UNDERSCORED AND REMEMBERED THAT EXCESS  
COMPLEXITY FOR UNDER-EQUIPPED, UNTRAINED, AND INEXPERIENCED  
MAURITUCIAN ARMED FORCES FALLS FAR SHORT OF GENERALLY-  
UNDERSTOOD LEVEL OF "SOPHISCATED WEAPONS".) IN  
SIMILAR FASHION, PRESSURES FOR CONTINUED MILITARY

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FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5090

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

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AMEMBASSY DAKAR  
AMEMBASSY RABAT

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 NOUAKCHOTT 0282

LIMDIS

BUILD-UP AND SPECIFICALLY FOR ACQUISITION OF FANCY  
HARDWARE MAY ARISE FROM CIVILIAN NATIONALISTS AS WELL,  
THE LONGER THE SAHARA WAR CONTINUES. STANDARD CON-  
VICTION OF NATIONALIST MILITANTS (WHEREVER THEY MAY  
BE) THAT NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IS INCOMPLETE WITHOUT  
SQUADRON OF JET FIGHTERS MAY BEGIN TO TURN UP HERE  
TOO, AND PUT DEVELOPMENTAL LEADERSHIP UNDER FURTHER  
PRESSURE TO CONTINUE AND EXPAND ARMS PROGRAM, EVEN IF  
AIRCRAFT ARE CRANKED UP ONLY ONCE A YEAR FOR INDEPENDENCE  
DAY FLYPAST.

5. IN SUM, QUESTION OF ARMS RESTRAINT WILL NOT BECOME  
REAL ISSUE AGAIN IN MAURITANIA FOR SEVERAL MORE YEARS--  
UNTIL AFTER CURRENT SAHARA WAR HAS FADED INTO HISTORY.  
THEN QUESTION WILL BE AN ISSUE ONLY IF APPETITES OF  
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY AND NATIONALIST MILITANTS HAVE  
IN FACT GOTTEN OUT OF HAND, AND IF DEVELOPERS IN  
GOVERNMENT ARE UNABLE TO HOLD THE LINE AND FAIL TO  
SECURE ALLOCATION OF VIRTUALLY ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES

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TO DEVELOPMENT EFFORT. WHEN THAT TIME COMES, UNITED  
STATES MAY BE ABLE TO WEIGH IN EFFECTIVELY ON SIDE OF  
DEVELOPERS, (EMPLOYING TECHNIQUES DEVISED IN PRESENT  
STUDY WHICH BY THEN WILL HAVE BEEN PROVED SUCCESSFUL IN  
OTHER LOCATIONS). MEANWHILE, JUDICIOUS PUBLICIZING HERE  
OF US EFFORTS IN FAVOR OF ARMS RESTRAINT ELSEWHERE  
WILL KEEP OUR HOPES AND COURAGE OF DEVELOPMENT PARTISANS  
IN MAURITANA.HANDYSIDE

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